Onderdeel van onderzoeksproject
Drones & Honeycombes

The battlefield has moved from the trench into the civic space. Cities and villages, people's homes, and the domesticated environment are the main theatre of war.
The Counter Insurgency Manual describes the transition of the battlefield from large territories, where one army clashes with another, into small civic enclaves that need to be cleared step by step. The manual is authored by General David Patreus, who led the NATO forces in Iraq and in Afghanistan. With this, he introduced the ‘Little Wars Doctrine’.

In 2009, in the region of Turagahn, Afghanistan, 1,500 homes were invaded by the Dutch army to be searched and cleared. They were seen as part of a growing ink-blot, a safe zone under the control of the coalition forces. The homes were invaded, one by one, in the search for threats and Taliban.

We asked a Dutch captain in the army who participated in the operation of Turagahn to explain us the procedure of a house search.

He explained that there are hard- and soft knock approaches. In both, the first priority is the safety of the troops. A house search-and clearing mission is conducted in the following steps:

1. Secure surroundings
2. Surprise (refers to time of entrance)
3. Overwhelming use of force
4. Speed of operation (as fast as possible)
5. Secure for personnel
6. The search for threat is done from spaces on top to spaces below. The soldiers are walking in zigzag steps, one after the other, making sure there are as few blind views as possible and that every space is scanned. They walk next to walls rather than windows, with guns charged and ready to use.

Like the battlefield, the simulation is moving more and more into our living environment. About a month ago a large military training took place in Tel Aviv’s largest market space turning it into a live simulator of a battlefield. Civilians kept conducting their ordinary daily activity nearby. These transitions are not typical to Israel and Palestine; this warfare doctrine, including the training simulations, was adopted by NATO forces.

Our civic space, as well as our architectural knowledge, are increasingly borrowed and subjected in order to train and to conduct war in.

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